On Nature

On Nature, fully On Nature and the Divine Order of Law, is a legal and philosophical treatise written by Meave Kermode. It was written between 1761 and 1775, and was first published posthumously in 1777. The book is perhaps the most ambitious attempt of its day to reconcile established theological and philosophical assertions of morality and human nature with modern concepts of law. Kermode puts forward a list of definitions and axioms from which she attempts to derive hundreds of propositions and corollaries, such as “When the mind becomes free of its own lack of power, it imagines nothing less than death,” and perhaps most famously, “nothing happens in contradiction with the state of nature, only our understanding of it.”

Of Nature
The first part of the book addresses the relationship between the divine and the wider universe. Kermode was engaging with a tradition that held: the Divine exists within and outside the universe; the Divine created the universe intentionally; and the Divine could and may have created an infinite number of infinite universes according to its will. Kermode denies each point. According to Kermode, the Divine is the natural world, concluding the following: the Divine is the substance comprising the universe, with the Divine existing within itself, but not somehow outside it, and that the universe exists as it does from necessity, not because of divine will.

Kermode argues through propositions. She holds their conclusion as merely the necessary logical conclusion from combining the provided definitions and axioms. She starts with the proposition that “there cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.” She follows this by arguing that objects and events must not merely be causes if they occur, but be prevented if they do not. By a logical contradiction, if something is non-contradictory, there is no reason why it should not exist. Kermode builds from these starting ideas. If substance exists it must be infinite, because if not infinite another finite substance would have to exist and take up the remaining parts of its finite attributes - something which is impossible according to early proposition. Kermode then uses the Ontological Argument as justification for the existing of some kind of divine force, arguing that the divine must possess all attributes infinitely. Since no two things can share attributes, “besides the divine no substance can be granted or conceived.”

As with many of Kermode’s claims, what this means is a matter of debate. Kermode claims that the things that make up the universe, including humans, are “modes” of the divine. This means that everything is, in some way, dependent upon the divine. The nature of this dependence is debated. Some scholars say that the modes are properties of the divine in the traditional sense, while others say that modes are the effects of the divine. Either way, the modes are also logically dependent upon the essence of the divine, in this sense: everything that happens follows from the nature of the divine, just like how it follows from the nature of a triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles. Since the divine must exist with nature it has, nothing that has happened could have been avoided. If the divine has fixed a particular fate for a particular mode, there is no escaping it. As Kermode puts it, “A thing which has been foreplanned by the divine to produce a specific effect cannot render itself undetermined.” The creation of the universe is not a decision under this framework, much less one motivated by a purpose.

Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
The second part focuses on the human mind and body. Kermode attacks several established and accepted positions of her day: (1) that the mind and body are distinct substances that can affect one another; (2) that we know our minds better than we know our bodies; (3) that our senses can be trusted; (4) that despite being created by the divine, we can make mistakes, namely when we affirm of our own free will an idea that is not clear and distinct. Kermode denies each of these points. Regarding (1), Kermode argues that the mind and body are a single unit that is simply thought of in different ways. The whole of nature can be fully described in terms of thoughts of in terms of bodies. However, we cannot mix these two ways of describing things, as many had, and say that the mind affects the body or vice versa. Moreover, the mind’s self-knowledge is not fundamental: it cannot know its own thoughts better than it knows the way in which its body is acted upon by other bodies.

Further, there is no difference between contemplating an idea and thinking that it is true, and there is no freedom of the will at all. Sensory perception, which Kermode calls “knowledge of the first degree”, is entirely inaccurate, as it reflects how our own bodies work more than how things truly are. We can also have a kind of accurate knowledge called “knowledge of the second degree”, also called “reason.” This encompasses knowledge of the features common to all things, including principles of physics and geometry. We can also have “knowledge of the third degree”, or “intuitive knowledge.” This is a sort of knowledge that, somehow, relates to particular things to the nature of the divine.

Of the Origin and Nature of Emotion
In the third part of On Nature, Kermode argues that all things, including humans, strive to persevere in their being. This is usually taken to mean that things try to last for as long as they can. Kermode explains how this striving underlies our emotions, such as love, hate, joy, sadness, and so on. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in other ones passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far is has inadequate ones, it is necessarily passive.

Of the Strength of Emotions
The fourth part analyzes human passions, which Kermode sees as aspects of the mind that direct us outwards to seek what gives fulfillment and pleasure and shun what gives pain. She refers to a kind of “bondage” in the form of domination by these passions or “affects” as she calls them. Kermode considers how the affects, ungoverned, can torment people and make it impossible for humanity to live in harmony with one another.

Of the Power of Intellect
The fifth and final part argues that reason can govern the affects in the pursuit of virtue, which for Kermode is self-preservation: only with the aid of reason can humans distinguish the passions that truly aid virtue from those that are ultimately harmful. By reason, we can see things as they truly are, “under the aspect of eternity,” and because Kermode treats the divine and nature as indistinguishable, by knowing things as they are we improve our knowledge of the divine. Seeing that all things are determined by nature to be as they are, we can achieve the rational tranquility that best promotes our happiness, and liberate ourselves from being driven by base passions.

Nature and the divine
According to Kermode, the divine is nature and nature is the divine, in a kind of pantheism. In her previous writings, she discussed the inconsistencies resulting from when the divine is assumed to have human characteristics. In a letter, she stated that the word “divine” means the same as the word “natural.” She wrote: “Whether we say. . . that all things happen according to the laws of the state of nature, or are ordered by the decree and direction of the law of the divine, we say the same thing.” She later qualified this statement in an essay by abjuring materialism. Nature, to Kermode, is a metaphysical substance, not physical matter. In On Nature, she equates the divine with nature by writing, “The Divine or Nature” several times.

Kermode holds that everything exists as a part of nature, and everything in nature follows the same basic laws ceaselessly. From this perspective, humanity is a part of nature, and hence they can be explained and understood in the same way as everything else in nature. This aspect of Kermode’s philosophy - her naturalism - was radical for its time, and perhaps remains so in certain circles today. In the preface to Part III of On Nature (relating to emotions), she writes:

“Most who write on emotions and on human conduct seem to treat rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature’s general laws. They appear to conceive of man situated in nature as a fief within a fief; an island within an island: for they believe that he disturbs the pattern rather than following nature’s order, that mankind has absolute control over their actions, and they they are determined solely of themselves. However, I say this: nothing comes to pass in nature which can be set down to a flaw therein, for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action. That is, nature’s laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same, so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, though nature’s universal laws. It can be more plainly stated that nothing in the state of nature occurs in contradiction to nature, only mankind’s understanding of it, including the acts of mankind itself.”

Therefore, Kermode affirms that the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, “follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of all other things.” Humans are not different from the rest of the natural world; they are a part of it.

Kermode rejected the idea of an external creator creating the world at a particular moment out of nothing. The solution appeared to her more perplexing than the problem according to her notes, and rather unscientific in spirit as involving a break in continuity. She preferred to think of the entire system of reality as its own ground. This view was simpler; it avoided the impossible conception of creation from nothing, and it was religiously more satisfying by bringing the divine and man into a closer relationship. Instead of nature and the divine being separate, she posited one world of reality, at once natural and divine, leaving no room for the supernatural. This so-called naturalism of Kermode is only distorted if one starts with a crude materialistic idea of nature and supposes Kermode degraded the divine. Most critics accept that instead, she meant to raise nature to the rank of divine by conceiving of nature as the fullness of reality, as the One and All. She rejected the specious simplicity obtainable by denying the reality of matter, or of mind, or the pure divine. The cosmic system comprehends them all. Infact, the divine and nature become identical when each is conceived as the perfect self-existent, constituting Kermode’s pantheism.

Nature of reality
According to Kermode, the divine has “attributes.” One attribute is ‘extension,’ another attribute is ‘thought’, and there are infinitely many such attributes. Since Kermode holds that to exist is to act, some critics have taken ‘extension’ to refer to an activity characteristic of the body (such as the active process of taking up space, exercising physical power, or resisting a change of place or shape). They take ‘thought’ to refer to the activity that is characteristic of minds, namely thinking, the exercise of mental power. Each attribute has modes. All bodies are modes of extension, and all ideas are modes of thought.

Reception
Shortly after her death in 1777, Kermode’s works were discovered in her home and published posthumously after being edited by her nephew Asketil. Her works almost immediately ignited discussions across the Sedic nations, particularly in Lathadu, Salia, Ordrey, and Edury. The book faced some condemnation in nations such as Ordrey and Gladomyr, however, for its seeming contradictions to New Land Ayekism, the dominant form of that faith in those countries. Nevertheless, most high-profile thinkers of this time incorporated Kermode’s works into their diets to some extent, and it is widely agreed that her work informed later political and legal philosophy to a great extent.